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Strategic Behaviour and Leadership
Patterns of Modern Chief Justices
C.L. OSTBERG AND MATTHEW E. WETSTEIN*
This study uses strategic behaviour, leadership change, and feminist theories to examine
patterns of judicial activity by the three post-Charter chief justices of the Supreme Court
of Canada. Building on prior scholarship, we use various methods to examine patterns of
majority voting, dissenting activity, opinion writing, ideological voting, and panel size across
the 1973 to 2014 period. While Chief Justices Lamer and Dickson exhibited clear patterns
of task leadership, we find strong evidence of strategic change by Chief Justice McLachlin
following her elevation to chief. She moved from a prolific dissenter as a puisne justice to a
chief who exhibited behaviour of both a task leader and a social leader, which scholars see
as highly uncommon. Her efforts to solidify her central role as a collegial leader within her
own court, which took place during a period of increasing panel sizes and a shrinking court
docket, are remarkable.
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AS WE REFLECT ON THE LAST YEAR of Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin’s tenure

at the helm of the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”), it makes intuitive sense
to look back on her career as chief justice to examine her leadership and explore
in greater depth how it compares to her two predecessors in the post-Charter era.
We focus on the post-Charter era because it serves as a distinctive break point in
the history of the Court’s rulings. Since all three of the post-Charter chiefs also
served as puisne justices on the Court for almost ten years before ascending to the
helm, we should also explore whether they dramatically changed their respective
behaviours on the bench once they acquired their new mantles of responsibility.
These inquiries become more salient given the decisive policy-making role the
Court has come to play in Canada’s political arena over the past 30 years, a role
that has drawn much attention and media scrutiny to the chief justice and the
Court. We, like prior judicial scholars, rely on rational choice theory and the
literature on judicial leadership to help guide the theoretical foundations of our
inquiry. However, we add new insights derived from feminist theories of gender
differences to guide our analysis. Ultimately, this study explores whether the
three post-Charter chief justices became more strategic in their majority voting
behaviours, opinion writing, choices of panel size, and ideological position taking
once they assumed the helms of their courts. Building on prior research, this study
explores in greater detail how leadership styles differed from chief to chief during
critical post-Charter years, helping us tease out whether any of the modern chief
justices have engaged in strong patterns of rational choice or strategic behaviour
to shape the direction of their courts, and whether Chief Justice McLachlin’s
behaviour might align with the literature on a distinctive feminine voice.
A study of this kind is important for numerous reasons. First, it provides a
more robust understanding of an institution that has come to play a dominant
role in Canadian politics in the post-Charter era. Second, an examination of
the differences between the roles taken by the first three post-Charter chief
justices may provide greater insight into leadership activity and possible gender
differences of future judicial elites. Third, assessing the impact of how panels
are struck has important theoretical implications for understanding strategic
behaviour on the Court as well as practical implications for other democratic
societies considering implementing similar institutional features. Fourth,
examining possible behavioural differences that occur after the transition from
puisne justice to chief justice enhances our theoretical understanding of strategic
and leadership behaviour and its contribution to leading social science theories.
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I. REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE
One of the salient social science paradigms used for studying political behaviour
and group dynamics is rational choice theory. The gist of this theory is that political
actors will pursue their policy preferences in most situations, but in small-group
settings they will sometimes augment their behaviour in order to avoid an
undesirable policy outcome.1 Since appellate courts are comprised of small groups
of justices who must interact with each other on a daily basis to hand down
rulings, judicial scholars use rational choice theory to help explain judicial voting
behaviour. Strategic scholars of judicial behaviour agree with attitudinal theorists
that a justice’s overarching goal is to seek his or her own policy preferences enacted
into law, yet since high court justices are not unconstrained unilateral actors and
cannot make binding law by themselves, they must take into consideration the
preferences of other actors in the system in the course of pursuing their own
policy goals.2 This research documents that justices in the United States engage
in a myriad of strategic behaviours at all stages of the judicial process, from the
selection of cases through opinion writing, in order to reach their most preferred
positions. For example, since it takes five to forge a winning coalition on a court
of nine justices, members often suppress their own preferred position when taking
into consideration the expectations and preferences of others in order to avoid
a worse case outcome. These scholars also document that strategic justices are
forward-thinking actors who, when facing policy choices, take into consideration
the expectations of outside governmental officials in a system of shared powers
and dominant majoritarian beliefs. Scholarship on the post-Charter SCC
highlights this type of inter-institutional strategic behaviour by documenting an
ongoing strategic dialogue with Parliament and other institutional actors over

1.
2.

Kenneth J Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 3rd ed (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2012); Peter C Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986).
Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998)
at 11-12; Forrest Maltzmann, James F Spriggs II & Paul J Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the
Supreme Court: The Collegial Game (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 17-18.
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the machinations and meanings of key Charter principles.3 Other scholarship,
in turn, has documented the strategic and political calculations that Canadian
justices make when deciding which cases to take on appeal.4 Collectively, these
scholars have shown that both US and Canadian justices act in a sophisticated
strategic manner by continually negotiating the expectations and responses of
other actors in the system when grappling with individual cases in an effort to
negotiate their most preferred policy positions.
Research demonstrates that leadership roles have a profound impact on
judicial behaviour on the Supreme Court of the United States.5 Pioneering
3.

4.

5.

For commentary on the Charter dialogue, see Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushell, “The
Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights
Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 75; Peter W Hogg &
Allison A Thornton, “Reply to ‘Six Degrees of Dialogue’” (1999) 37:3 Osgoode Hall LJ
529; Christopher P Manfredi & James B Kelly, “Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to
Hogg & Bushell” (1999) 37:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 513; Christopher P Manfredi & James B
Kelly, “Dialogue, Deference, and Restraint: Judicial Independence and Trial Procedures”
(2001) 64:2 Sask L Rev 323; Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism
or Democratic Dialogue, revised ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016); Janet L Hiebert, Charter
Conflicts: What Is Parliament’s Role? (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002);
Matthew A Hennigar, “Expanding the ‘Dialogue’ Debate: Canadian Federal Government
Responses to Lower Court Charter Decisions” (2004) 37:1 Can J Pol Sci 3; Matthew A
Hennigar, “The Canadian Government’s Litigation Strategy in Sexual Orientation Cases”
(Paper delivered at the Canadian Political Science Association’s 76th Annual Meeting, 4 June
2004), online: <www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2004/Hennigar.pdf>; Peter W Hogg, Allison A
Bushell Thornton & Wade K Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited: Or ‘Much Ado About
Metaphors’” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 (published in a Special Issue of the Osgoode
Hall Law Journal entitled “Charter Dialogue: Ten Years Later”).
See e.g. Roy B Flemming, Tournament of Appeals: Granting Judicial Review in Canada
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); Roy B Flemming & Glen S Krutz, “Selecting Appeals for
Judicial Review in Canada: A Replication and Multivariate Test of American Hypotheses”
(2004) 64:1 J Politics 232.
See David J Danelski, “An Exploratory Study of Opinion Assignment by the Chief Justice
Revisited” in David J Danelski & Artemus Ward, eds, The Chief Justice: Appointment &
Influence (Ann Arbor, Mich: University of Michigan Press, 2016) 47 [Danelski, “Opinion
Assignment”]; David J Danelski, “The Earliest Social Science Studies of the Chief Justice
Revisited” in Danelski & Ward, ibid, 13 [Danelski, “Social Science”]; Charles M Cameron &
Tom Clark, “The Chief Justice and Procedural Power” in Danelski & Ward, ibid, 202; David
J Danelski, The Chief Justice and the Supreme Court (PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago,
1961) [unpublished]; David J Danelski, “Conflict and Its Resolution in the Supreme
Court” (1967) 11:1 J Confl Resolution 71 [Danelski, “Conflict and Resolution”]; David
J Danelski & Jeanne C Danelski, “Leadership in the Warren Court” in Sheldon Goldman
& Austin Sarat, eds, American Court Systems: Readings in Judicial Process and Behavior
(New York: Longman, 1989) 500; David J Danelski, “The Influence of the Chief Justice
in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court” in Goldman & Sarat, ibid, 19 [Danelski,
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work by David Danelski relied on social psychological research of small-group
behaviour to develop two theoretical archetypes for explaining leadership on the
US Supreme Court.6 He argues that, for a court to work effectively in deciding
cases and maintaining a congenial environment, a “task leader” and a “social
leader” must emerge to guide the decision-making process, although both roles
may be assumed by the same justice.7 According to Danelski, a task leader is
the intellectual powerhouse of the court, whose technical competence, analytical
ability, and intensity and force of argument allow him or her to sway other
colleagues to his or her stance in a given case.8 In complex cases, colleagues often
rely on the task leader for intellectual guidance. The task leader is a highly skilled
legal orator and writer who often drives the resolution of cases without taking
into consideration the feelings of others.9 As such, task leaders, in theory, write
more majority opinions than their peers. Danelski argues the social leader, on the
other hand, works to foster collegiality, smooth ruffled feathers, and bolster the
esteem of others in an institutional environment that encourages conflict over
core value positions in salient cases.10 The social leader’s aim is to ensure that
everyone feels valued and to foster favourable social interactions so the court can
work most effectively as a unit on a daily basis. The social leader is the best-liked
member of a court because he or she empowers colleagues by telling jokes,
encouraging others, avoiding conflict, restoring the peace through negotiation
and bargaining, and providing passive acceptance of other colleagues’ views.11
Implicitly, social leaders are harder to identify through case outcomes, but their
supportive, collegial nature is theoretically found in joining majority coalitions
more frequently than their peers, and in dissenting less often.
Subsequent scholars have built on Danelski’s groundbreaking work to
explore in greater depth the interrelationship between leadership activity and

“Influence”]; Walter F Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1964); Robert J Steamer, Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court (Columbia,
SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1986); Thomas G Walker, Lee Epstein & William
J Dixon, “On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme
Court” (1988) 50:2 J Politics 361; Stacia L Haynie, “Leadership and Consensus on the U.S.
Supreme Court” (1992) 54:4 J Politics 1158; Saul Brenner & Timothy M Hagle, “Opinion
Writing and Acclimation Effect” (1996) 18:3 Political Behav 235.
6. Danelski, “Conflict and Resolution,” supra note 5 at 79-82.
7. Ibid at 81.
8. Ibid at 79-81.
9. Ibid at 80.
10. Ibid at 81-82.
11. Ibid. See also Danelski, “Influence,” supra note 5 at 24-26.
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judicial behaviour within and across different US courts.12 We believe that social
leaders have become equated with concerns about court solidarity and the overall
satisfaction of justices in expressing their views and being heard, while task leaders
have become associated with concerns about the overall intellectual prominence,
stability, and direction of a court.
Danelski’s theoretical constructs for explaining leadership roles on the
US Supreme Court dovetail nicely with certain feminist scholarship exploring
distinctive gender differences in leadership styles between top-level policymakers.
It makes sense to explore the impact of gender differences near the end of the first
female chief justice’s career. Scholars in this field have often relied on two strands
of feminist theory grounded in concepts from sociolinguistics and psychology to
guide their analysis. Pioneering work by psychologist Carol Gilligan maintains
that men view the world in a more linear, hierarchical, and individualistic manner,
and thus are likely to resolve conflicts according to abstract rules incorporated in
the language of absolute rights applied in a zero-sum, all-or-nothing fashion.13
Women, on the other hand, tend to see the world as a web of relationships
contained in a larger interdependent community and thus resolve conflict
in a more conciliatory fashion utilizing the language of reconciliation and
responsibility to society.14 Deborah Tannen’s work in the area of sociolinguistics
reinforces Gilligan’s contention, suggesting that women’s communication styles in
a wide variety of settings are aimed at solidifying relationships, providing support
for others, and building consensus, while men often approach communication
in an adversarial manner.15 Research in the field of small group dynamics in
legislative settings arrives at similar conclusions about the more collegial and
democratic nature of women leaders.16 The theoretical paradigm developed by
these feminist scholars has become more prevalent as more women have been
elected and appointed to powerful positions in government and courts. Having
said this, the feminist arguments advanced above are by no means universally
12. See e.g. Murphy, supra note 5; Steamer, supra note 5; Walker, Epstein & Dixon, supra note 5,
Haynie, supra note 5.
13. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003). See also Barbara Palmer, “Women in
the American Judiciary: Their Influence and Impact” (2001) 23:3 Women & Politics 91.
14. Gilligan, supra note 13.
15. See Deborah Tannen, You Just Don’t Understand: Women and Men in Conversation (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1990) at 24-25.
16. Lyn Kathlene, “Power and Influence in State Legislative Policymaking: The Interaction of
Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates” (1994) 88:3 Am Pol Sci Rev 560 at
561, 567-69, 573-74.
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accepted. A meta-analysis of more than 2000 psychological studies of the gender
difference argument points out that in most circumstances, a gender similarities
hypothesis has garnered more empirical justification.17 According to Janet Shibley
Hyde, females and males are quite similar in their psychological patterns of
behaviour across a large number of domains like cognitive performance, modes
of communication, social and personality traits, and notions of psychological
well-being.18 Even so, psychological studies show small to moderate gender
differences in communication and leadership abilities, including a slightly greater
tendency for men to interrupt in conversations, to engage in more frequent use
of verbal aggression, to exhibit a slightly stronger leaning towards autocratic
leadership, to be moderately more distrustful of others in groups, to be less
oriented to an ethic of care for others, and to express significantly lower levels of
agreeableness and tender mindedness.19 All of these domains have the potential
to reflect gendered differences that might appear in the activities of justices,
especially patterns of dissent and majority-joining behaviour. These conceptions
of gender difference, when combined with Danelski’s constructs of leadership,
provide a compelling line of inquiry especially at the end of the first female chief
justice’s tenure on the SCC.
There has been a host of studies aimed as assessing gender difference in the
legal realm in the United States and Canada, although most of the studies have
17. Janet Shibley Hyde, “The Gender Similarities Hypothesis” (2005) 60:6 Am Psychol
581 [Hyde, “Gender Hypothesis”]; Michael S Kimmel, Amy Aronson & Amy Kaler,
The Gendered Society Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Janet Shibley
Hyde, “Gender Similarities and Differences” (2014) 65 Ann Rev Psychol 373 [Hyde,
“Gender Differences”].
18. Hyde, “Gender Hypothesis,” supra note 17 at 583-86; Hyde, “Gender Differences,” supra
note 17 at 380-89.
19. Ibid. See also Kristen J Anderson & Campbell Leaper, “Meta-Analyses of Gender Effects
on Conversational Interruption: Who, What, When, Where, and How” (1998) 39:3&4
Sex Roles 225; Janet Shibley Hyde, “How Large Are Gender Differences in Aggression?
A Developmental Meta-Analysis” (1984) 20:4 Developmental Psychol 722; Janet Shibley
Hyde, “Gender Differences in Aggression” in Janet Shibley Hyde & Marcia C Linn, eds, The
Psychology of Gender: Advances through Meta-analysis (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1986) 51; George P Knight et al, “Emotional Arousal and Gender Differences
in Aggression: A Meta-Analysis” (2002) 28:5 Aggressive Behav 366; John Archer, “Sex
Differences in Aggression in Real-World Settings: A Meta-Analytic Review” (2004) 8:4
Rev Gen Psychol 291; Alice H Eagly & Blair T Johnson, “Gender and Leadership Style:
A Meta-Analysis” (1990) 108:2 Psychol Bull 233; Alan Feingold, “Gender Differences
in Personality: A Meta-Analysis” (1994) 116:3 Psychol Bull 429; Sara Jaffee & Janet
Shibley Hyde, “Gender Differences in Moral Orientation: A Meta-Analysis” (2000) 126:5
Psychol Bull 703.
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focused on lower appellate behaviour at the micro-level in specific areas of law.
These studies have yielded mixed results. While some scholars suggest that no
coherent generalizations can be made about the impact of women justices on
lower appellate courts,20 others have demonstrated that gender differences do
emerge in particular types of legal disputes, such as employment discrimination.21
The few studies that have examined gender difference on the apex supreme
courts in the two countries have also yielded mixed results.22 Comments by the
20. See e.g. Herbert M Kritzer & Thomas M Uhlman, “Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex of
Judge and Defendant in Criminal Case Disposition” (1977) 14:2 Soc Sci J 77; John Gruhl,
Cassia Spohn & Susan Welch, “Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges” (1981)
25:2 Am J Pol Sci 308; Jon Gottschall, “Carter’s Judicial Appointments: The Influence of
Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals” (1983)
67:4 Judicature 165; Thomas G Walker & Deborah J Barrow, “The Diversification of
the Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications” (1985) 47:2 J Pol 596; Sue Davis,
“President Carter’s Selection Reforms and Judicial Policymaking: A Voting Analysis of the
United States Courts of Appeals” (1986) 14:4 Am Pol Q 328.
21. See e.g. Sue Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R Songer, “Voting Behavior and Gender on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals” (1993) 77:3 Judicature 129; Donald R Songer, Sue Davis & Susan
Haire, “A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts
of Appeals” (1994) 56:2 J Politics 425. For evidence of other gender differences, see Gerard S
Gryski, Eleanor C Main & William J Dixon, “Models of State High Court Decision Making
in Sex Discrimination Cases” (1986) 48:1 J Politics 143; David W Allen & Diane E Wall,
“The Behavior of Women State Supreme Court Justices: Are They Tokens or Outsiders?”
(1987) 12:2 Just Sys J 232; Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, “Gender, Race, and Partisanship
on the Michigan Supreme Court” (2000) 63:4 Alb L Rev 1205; Donald R Songer & Kelly
A Crews-Meyer, “Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making in State Supreme Courts”
(2000) 81:3 Soc Sci Q 750; Jennifer L Peresie, “Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts” (2005) 114:7 Yale LJ 1759.
22. For U.S. studies see Suzanna Sherry, “Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication” (1986) 72:3 Va L Rev 543; Karen O’Connor & Jeffrey A Segal, “Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor and the Supreme Court’s Reaction to Its First Female Member” (1990) 10:2
Women & Politics 95; Susan Behuniak-Long, “Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and the Power
of Maternal Legal Thinking” (1992) 54:3 Rev Politics 417; Sue Davis, “The Voice of Sandra
Day O’Connor” (1993) 77:3 Judicature 134; Jilda M Aliotta, “Justice O’Connor and the
Equal Protection Clause: a Feminine Voice?” (1995) 78:5 Judicature 232; Patricia A Sullivan
& Steven R Goldzwig, “Abortion and Undue Burdens: Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and
Judicial Decision-Making” (1996) 16:3 Women & Politics 27; Nancy Maveety, Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor: Strategist on the Supreme Court (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield,
1996). For Canadian studies of gender difference in judicial behavior see Bertha Wilson,
“Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 507; Peter
McCormick & Twyla Job, “Do Women Judges Make a Difference? An Analysis by Appeal
Court Data” (1993) 8:1 CJLS 135 [McCormick & Job, “Women Judges”]; Candace C
White, “Gender Differences on the Supreme Court” in FL Morton, ed, Law, Politics, and the
Judicial Process in Canada, 3rd ed (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002) 85; Donald
R Songer & Ann Clark, “Judge Gender and Voting in Appellate Courts: A Cross National
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justices themselves reveal different sentiments. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
claimed, “[t]here is simply no empirical evidence that gender differences lead to
discernible differences in rendering judgments,”23 while Justice Bertha Wilson
concluded that “[t]here is merit in Gilligan’s analysis.”24 Justice Louis LeBel, who
recently served with four women on the Canadian bench, stated: “My gut feeling
is that it does make a difference in a number of issues,” because women have
“a certain sensitivity” and a “vision that is different from men in some cases.”25
Given the contested viewpoints on the gender difference hypothesis, the question
remains whether the leadership style and voting behaviour of the first female
Canadian chief justice are demonstrably different from her two post-Charter
male predecessors.
Female chief justices, like their male counterparts, are in an optimal position
to take on either the task or social leadership role, although Danelski acknowledges
that these roles can be taken on by other members of the bench.26 He argues that
few US chief justices have been able to effectively exercise both roles—with the
exception of Chief Justices John Marshall and Charles Evan Hughes—because
the task leaders tend to foster conflict and tension while the social leaders try to
alleviate antagonism and integrate the bench into a more cohesive unit.27 Given
the institutional power of the chief justice at all stages of the judicial process,
including the selection of cases, assignment of opinion writing, and service at
the administrative helm of the court, the chief is in a key position to take on

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

and Cross Institutional Analysis” (Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Southern
Political Science Association, 2002) [unpublished]; Donald R Songer, Ann Clark & Rebecca
Wood, “The Effects of Judge Gender in Appellate Courts: A Comparative Cross-National
Test” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
30 September 2003), online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1539882>;
CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of
Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) [Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making];
Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, “Judging Gender: Difference and Dissent at the
Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 15:1&2 Intl J Leg Profession 57; Donald R Songer et al,
Law, Ideology, and Collegiality: Judicial Behaviour in the Supreme Court of Canada (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012) [Songer et al, Law, Ideology]; Peter McCormick,
“Who Writes? Gender and Judgment Assignment in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014)
51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 595 [McCormick, “Who Writes”].
Sandra Day O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice (New
York: Random House, 2003) at 191.
Wilson, supra note 22 at 520.
Tonda MacCharles, “Top court benefits from diversity, LeBel Says,” Toronto Star (1
December 2014), A8 (Lexis).
Danelski, “Influence,” supra note 5 at 24-25.
Ibid at 25.
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either of these leadership roles during his or her tenure. Although the chief justice
is often referred to as “first among equals,” this characterization is misleading
because it fails to acknowledge the various advantages chief justices have at their
disposal to acquire either or both the task and social leadership roles.28 Recent
empirical work in the United States confirms some of Danelski’s claims. For
example, Charles M. Cameron and Tom Clark indicate that modern US chief
justices have tended to steer “the most important cases to [their] ideological
allies,” if not to themselves, and that the ideological location of the chief justice
in a given case is a strong predictor of the disposition of that case, although that
power is constrained by various institutional norms, expectations, and operating
procedures.29 For instance, chief justices must take into consideration workload
balance, varying abilities of justices, operational efficiency, and judicial expertise
while also considering their policy preferences.30 Moreover, chief justices may
moderate their own policy preferences in order to foster greater agreement and
thereby strengthen court legitimacy.31 US chief justices, like presidents, also
experience a potential honeymoon period during the first few years as chief
which affords them greater opportunities to forge unanimous opinions on the
court.32 Collectively, this body of work showcases both the power and limitations
that promote and constrain a chief justice’s ability to lead his or her own court.
In the Canadian context, a chief justice’s ability to strike different sized
panels provides a unique strategic lever that he or she can use to exert ideological
control over the outcome of a case. Although some contend chief justices do not
abuse this power across all cases, they do tend to select ideological allies more
frequently to hear arguments in politically salient Charter disputes.33 Interviews
with the justices, on the other hand, have led other scholars to downplay the
notion of striking ideological panels. Indeed, Ian Greene, Carl Baar, Peter
28. Ibid.
29. Cameron & Clark, supra note 5 at 221-24. See also Maltzmann, Spriggs &
Wahlbeck, supra note 2.
30. Maltzmann, Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 2; David J Danelski, “An Exploratory Study
of Opinion Assignment by the Chief Justice Revisited” in Danelski & Ward, supra note
5, 47 at 48-57.
31. Maltzmann, Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 2 at 32-56. See also Drew Noble Lanier &
Sandra L Wood, “Moving on Up: Institutional Position, Politics, and the Chief Justice”
(2001) 22:1 Am Rev of Pol 93.
32. Amy Steigerwalt, Pamela C Corley & Artemus Ward, “Honeymoon on the Court? Chief
Justices and Consensus Building on the Supreme Court” in Danelski & Ward, supra
note 5, 235 at 237.
33. Lori Hausegger & Stacia Haynie, “Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use of Panels in the
Canadian Supreme Court and South African Appellate Division” (2003) 37:3 Law & Soc’y
Rev 635 at 655.
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McCormick, George Szablowski, and Martin Thomas conclude that panel and
opinion assignment are shaped more by the chief ’s interest in seeking volunteers
for opinion writing, balancing the workload, relying on justices’ legal expertise,
and delivering the most unified coalition.34 Our research indicates that a larger
panel size makes it mathematically less likely that a chief will write the majority
opinion.35 However, we found that chief justices do write a higher percentage of
majority opinions while serving as chief and simultaneously curb their tendencies
to cast dissenting votes. Recent work by Peter McCormick has confirmed the
tendency by chief justices to assign more majority opinions to themselves, and
particularly ones that are significant to a chief ’s personal politics and are likely
to garner publicity. He has also confirmed a gender gap across the Dickson,
Lamer, and McLachlin Courts in the assignment of fewer important opinions to
female puisne justices.36 These male/female differences align well with the body
of scholarship on voting differences and opinion writing on appellate courts.37
While earlier research in Canada has analyzed strategic leadership of
the chief justices by looking at majority opinion writing, dissenting opinion
writing, and dissenting voting,38 it has failed to examine the change after a
puisne justice’s transition to chief and its effect on the SCC’s mean majority
position, its ideological direction over time, and its impact on average panel size
in light of a decreasing docket. This study turns to these critical indicators of
chief justice leadership. It also expands the scope of inquiry to include the bulk
of Chief Justice McLachlin’s tenure beyond an initial glimpse of her first two
years. More significantly, this study has the ability, for the first time, to consider
possible gender-related factors in assessing the impact of the three post-Charter
34. Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-Making in Canada’s Courts of Appeal (Toronto: James
Lorimer, 1998) at 119. See also Songer et al, Law, Ideology, supra note 22 at 88; Emmett
MacFarlane, Governing from the Bench: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Role
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 104-05; McCormick, “Who Writes,” supra note 22.
35. Matthew E Wetstein & CL Ostberg, “Strategic Leadership and Political Change on the
Supreme Court of Canada: Analyzing the Transition to Chief Justice” (2005) 38:3 Can J Pol
Sci 653 at 663-66 [Wetstein & Ostberg, “Strategic Leadership”].
36. McCormick, “Who Writes,” supra note 22.
37. McCormick & Job, “Women Judges,” supra note 22; White, supra note 22; Ostberg &
Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 22 at 115-154; Songer et al, Law, Ideology,
supra note 22 at 132-152; Belleau & Johnson, supra note 22; John Szmer, Susan W Johnson
& Tammy A Sarver, “Does the Lawyer Matter? Influencing Outcomes on the Supreme
Court of Canada” (2007) 41:2 Law & Soc’y Rev 279; Erin B Kaheny, John J Szmer &
Tammy A Sarver, “Women Lawyers before the Supreme Court of Canada” (2011) 44:1
Can J Pol Sci 83.
38. Wetstein & Ostberg, “Strategic Leadership,” supra note 35.
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chief justices. The analysis that follows focuses on majority voting behaviour,
opinion writing, ideological voting, and panel composition across four decades
(1973-2014) and three post-Charter chief justiceships, situating these acts of
judicial behaviour within the prisms of rational choice, strategic behaviour,
leadership, and feminist theories.
There are some limitations to this research that are worth noting at the
onset. First, although statistical analysis of case outcomes and overall records
of voting and authorship provide important insights into leadership patterns,
a more complete picture of strategic interaction on the Court will emerge only
after an exploration of the inner dynamics of the Court, which are typically
revealed in conference notes and draft opinions. Second, our analysis treats
each case as a unique and equal data point in the data set, which does not
acknowledge that some cases and opinions provide more salient and important
opportunities for leadership activity (e.g., cases that are bound to draw media
attention). We leave to another day the exploration of this type of leadership
analysis. Third, we analyze all cases, including brief oral judgments and cases with
lengthier written reasons for judgment. Some readers may criticize our decision
to include oral judgments because they are almost always unanimous and almost
always delivered by the senior justice on the panel. As such, the patterns we
report here may inflate the overall patterns of agreement among the justices. Our
decision to include all cases was driven by the desire to address the activities of the
justices across the full panoply of cases they decide. We suspect that a subsequent
study limited only to cases with written reasons for judgment may amplify the
significant findings we report here. Finally, our analysis focuses on patterns
of dissent authorship, dissenting votes, and majority votes, while omitting
analysis of written concurring opinions. Readers might point out that separate
concurrences may be just as important an expression of difference as dissents,
and may carry as much substantive legal significance. Having said this, we hasten
to note that concurrences are qualitatively different than dissenting opinions or
dissenting votes, which reflect an opposition to the dispositive outcome of the
case and whom the justice believes should win the dispute. While recognizing the
significance of separate concurrences, we leave to another study to determine the
prominence of leadership and joining behaviours in those formal expressions of
difference with the majority author.39 Despite these four limitations, we believe
the empirical analysis of case outcomes and opinion writing behaviour that

39. We are grateful for the anonymous reviewers of our article for pointing out this
limitation to our study.
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we highlight provides a critical insight into the leadership attributes of the
post-Charter chiefs.

II. DATA AND METHODS: ANALYZING PUBLISHED
OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA FROM
1973 TO 2014
The data for this study is drawn from all published opinions of the SCC from
1973 to 2014, which becomes the source for calculating annual tabulations of
majority voting, writing of opinions, liberal decisions, and panel sizes. Liberal
decisions are those that support criminal defendants in criminal cases, decisions
upholding Charter rights, decisions supporting rights claimants, decisions that
promote equality rights, decisions favouring unions and “underdogs” in economic
disputes, and decisions favouring the taxing power of the government in tax cases.
The 1973 to 2014 period is highlighted for analysis because it encompasses an era
of significant constitutional transformation in Canada and documents a period
where the Court has played an increasingly central political role in the policy
process. Key data points are created each year for the three justices in our study
(Chief Justices Brian Dickson, Lamer, and McLachlin), and summary scores for
the rest of the justices on the bench during those years. Building on earlier work,
we use a pooled cross-sectional data set featuring annual observations for Justices
Dickson (1973-1990), Lamer (1980-1999) and McLachlin (1989-2014) for a
total of 64 annual judge-level observations.
There are six dependent variables in the study: (1) the annual percentage
of majority votes cast, (2) the annual percentage of majority opinions written,
(3) the annual percentage of dissenting opinions, (4) the annual percentage of
unanimous opinions, (5) the annual percentage of liberal voting choices, and (6)
the annual average of case panel size. The first variable is designed to track whether
justices alter their voting behaviour to join majority coalitions more frequently
once they ascend to the chief justice position. As mentioned earlier, the literature
on social leadership and strategic choice indicates the chief should join majority
coalitions more frequently in order to control the opinion writing and influence
the direction of the law.40 If this is true, we expect the percentage of majority votes
to increase after a justice becomes chief. The second, complementary variable
follows the majority authorship rates before becoming chief justice (“pre-chief ”)
and after becoming chief justice (“post-chief ”). It is expected, and past research
40. Danelski, “Opinion Assignment,” supra note 5.
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confirms, that chiefs tend to write higher percentages of majority opinions to exert
greater control over their own court.41 The third variable, assessing the annual
percentage of dissenting opinions pre- and post-chief, is based on prior research
which hypothesizes that chiefs will reduce their dissenting activity in order to
situate themselves more frequently in the majority coalitions of their court.42
Although the analysis of written opinions has been featured in earlier scholarship,
our study extends the opinion analysis to almost the full complement of the
McLachlin Court cases (fourteen years rather than the initial two years). The last
three dependent variables, like the first set, break new ground in the Canadian
literature by exploring whether justices shift their ideological position within
the Court once they become chief, whether unanimity rates are impacted by
particular chief justices, and whether modern chief justices make strategic changes
in the size of panels selected to hear cases. Research by US scholars indicates that
ideological movement towards the centre of the SCOTUS makes strategic sense
because it allows a chief justice to write more majority opinions, control opinion
assignment, and indirectly control the content of opinions.43 Additionally,
if a chief is a strong social and task leader, the court should speak more frequently
with a unanimous voice. The final dependent variable takes into consideration
the chief ’s power to create panels and tests whether strategic activity has emerged
in this area. One hypothesis, drawn from the strategic and attitudinal literature,
would suggest that chiefs can enhance their leadership powers by selecting
like-minded justices and by establishing smaller panels. A contrary hypothesis
can be drawn from the literature on social leadership and interviews with the
justices: These sources suggest that the workload is shared and the experience of
being a justice is enhanced when panels are larger and more inclusive. Feminist
theory adds a layer of complexity to this hypothesis by suggesting that, all other
things being equal, a female chief justice might devote more attention to the
social cohesion of the court’s work than her male counterparts. In short, a female
chief might be expected to include more voices in the chorus of cases heard and
might devote more attention to building a consensus within those larger panels.
41. Wetstein & Ostberg, “Strategic Leadership,” supra note 35.
42. Readers should note that we do not analyze patterns of writing separate concurrences in this
study (concurrences or joining of concurrences are coded as majority/non-dissenting votes
in our study). We believe it would be fruitful to examine patterns of concurrence separately
to tease out how they might reflect an inability to lead the Court to a majority outcome
and whether concurrence behaviour produces distinctively different regression coefficients
than those found in our study for dissents and dissenting votes. This is a research project left
for another day.
43. Epstein & Knight, supra note 2; Maltzmann, Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 2.
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Our study examines which of these hypotheses play out in the behaviour of the
three post-Charter chief justices.
The study uses a host of independent variables and examines their
relative power to explain the patterns of behaviour mentioned above. Our key
independent variable is the chief versus non-chief status of the three post-Charter
justices in our study, and is denoted each year by a dichotomous indicator (0 =
non-chief, 1 = chief ). As mentioned above, and in line with prior research on
leadership activity, it is expected that once the three justices move to the centre
chair they will exhibit greater task and social leadership and strategic behaviour
by joining more majority coalitions, writing a higher percentage of majority
opinions, decreasing dissenting authorship, shifting their ideological position
towards the centre of the Court, and strategically using panel size power.44 There
are two additional justice-level independent variables included in the equations,
namely whether Justice Dickson or Justice McLachlin is in the chief role
(1 = chief, 0 = not chief ) to track any distinctive leadership traits between the
three post-Charter chief justices. Chief Justice Lamer was kept out of the equation
for comparative purposes.45 There are several other independent variables that
are included in our analysis as control variables to ensure there are no rival
explanations for any possible changes in the judicial behaviour examined. Since
there is high turnover on the Court, and shifting ideological composition can
influence a chief justice’s voting behaviour and authorship activity, a measure
calculating the ideological distance from the Court mean was included to assess
for this possible effect.46 The logic here is that when a chief justice is closer to
44. Our hypotheses are drawn from Danelski and McCormick. See Danelski, “Opinion
Assignment,” supra note 5; Danelski, “Conflict and Resolution,” supra note 5; Danelski,
“Influence,” supra note 5; Danelski, “Social Science,” supra note 5; Peter McCormick,
“Career Patterns and the Delivery of Reasons for Judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada,
1949-1993” (1994) 5 SCLR (2d) 499 [McCormick, “Career Patterns”]; McCormick, “Who
Writes,” supra note 22.
45. In some instances the omitted justice is Chief Justice Dickson because the observed patterns
of behaviour make him the most obvious justice to place in the comparative role.
46. See Lawrence Baum, “Measuring Policy Change in the U.S. Supreme Court” (1988)
82:3 Am Pol Sci Rev 905; Lawrence Baum, “Membership Change and Collective Voting
Change in the United States Supreme Court” (1992) 54:1 J Politics 3; Lanier & Wood,
supra note 31; Wetstein & Ostberg, “Strategic Leadership,” supra note 35. We calculate the
ideological distance by scoring judicial votes as either liberal or conservative based on the
disposition of the case and parties involved. Our method follows the pioneering work of
Harold Spaeth in the US setting and other Canadian Supreme Court of Canada scholars.
See Songer et al, Law, Ideology, supra note 22. For the treatment of ideology in US Supreme
Court cases, see Harold Spaeth, United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-1997
Terms (East Lansing, Mich: Michigan State University, 1998), online: <doi.org/10.3886/
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the ideological mean of the Court as a whole in any given case, he or she is
more likely to join the majority coalition and have more opportunities to write
opinions. Since scholarship indicates that newly-minted chief justices write fewer
majority opinions in the course of acclimating to the bench, an independent
variable identifying the first two years as chief for the three justices was included
to further test whether a freshmen or honeymoon effect appears (1 = first two
years as chief justice, 0 = all other years as chief ).47
Four other independent variables were included in the analysis that might
influence the judicial activity of the chief justice, namely the number of new
justices on the bench, workload, prominence of a case, and panel size. The
number of new justices elevated to the Court in a given year might increase
the voting and authorship behaviour of a chief justice because scholarship has
shown that chief justices tend to assign freshmen to a smaller workload to
help them acclimate to the bench.48 In such circumstances, the chief justice is
more likely to strike smaller panel sizes and has more opportunity to join the
majority and write majority opinions. Since a heavy workload can impact how
panels are structured, and majority authorship patterns by the various justices,
we included a variable that calculates the number of cases the Court heard on a
yearly basis from 1973 to 2014. We hypothesized that when justices face more
workload pressure and time constraints in a given year, they are more likely to
join majority coalitions and write fewer dissents. Unlike in the United States, the
Canadian chief justice has the power to create five-, seven-, and nine-member
panels. Although scholarship assessing whether Canadian chief justices utilize
this power to their advantage has yielded mixed results, it is logical to expect
that larger panel sizes would generate more conflict in a given case, especially in
politically high-profile cases, because the more people who are in the room, the
greater likelihood for conflict to emerge.49 This, coupled with the fact that there
has been a movement towards larger panel sizes in recent decades, indicates the
need to include an independent variable to control for the impact that average
panel size per year has on the voting behaviours and authorship activities of the
justices. Since Charter cases tend to constitute some of the most controversial
and high-profile constitutional cases the Court has heard in the last forty years,
it serves as a viable, though imperfect, measure of salient issues that come before
the bench. As such, we calculated the percent of Charter cases heard by the Court
ICPSR09422.v9>.
47. Lanier & Wood, supra note 31; McCormick, “Career Patterns,” supra note 44.
48. CL Ostberg, Matthew E Wetstein & Craig R Ducat, “Acclimation Effects on the
Supreme Court of Canada: A Cross-Cultural Examination of Judicial Folklore” (2003)
84:3 Soc Sci Q 704.
49. Ibid; Hausegger & Haynie, supra note 33; Greene et al, supra note 34.

494

(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

in a given year and hypothesize that the more Charter cases the Court hears,
the greater likelihood that dissent will emerge. However, one could argue that
in high-profile Charter cases, the chief justice is more likely to join the majority
coalition and pen the opinion in order to control the legal direction of the Court.
Thus, this variable was included to see which hypothesis played out. Collectively,
these independent variables were used in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
equations to tease out possible countervailing factors beyond strategic activity
that might explain judicial behaviour of the three chief justices.

III. RESULTS
A. MAJORITY AND LIBERAL VOTING PATTERNS AS PUISNE AND CHIEF
JUSTICE

Table 1 provides an initial glimpse at the change in the percent majority and
liberal voting behaviour of the three post-Charter chief justices throughout their
tenure along with a calculation of their distance from the majority and liberal
means of the Court. It is interesting to note that, unlike members of the US
Supreme Court, all three justices exhibit a very high percentage of majority
voting throughout their career, although there is a change in voting behaviour
for two of the post-Charter chiefs. Specifically, Justices Dickson and McLachlin
increased their frequency of majority votes when they transitioned to the centre
chair, while Justice Lamer did not (+3.2 and +4.6 for Dickson and McLachlin
respectively, versus -2.9). Only Justice McLachlin’s behaviour was statistically
significant, indicating that she was almost five percent more likely to vote with
the majority after she became chief than when she was a puisne justice. In order
to achieve this change both she and Justice Dickson changed their percent liberal
voting behaviour in statistically significant ways, although in opposite directions
(see column two of Table 1). While Justice Dickson decreased his liberal voting
by 8.5%, Justice McLachlin increased hers by almost 9%, so they had to move
in opposite directions to situate themselves in the majorities of their own courts
once they became chief. Although Justice Lamer also decreased his liberal
voting behaviour by 4.6%, his movement was not demonstratively different
from his earlier pre-chief behaviour. One must also take into consideration the
changing nature of the court composition over each chief justice’s tenure before
reaching any conclusions, which is a factor we control for in the third and fourth
columns of the table.
The third and fourth columns of Table 1 calculate the distances of these
justices from the majority and liberal means of the other justices on the Court
to help shed light on their altered activities during their transitions to chief.
While Justice Lamer’s distance from the majority and liberal mean of the Court
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did not change throughout his tenure, the same cannot be said for the other
two justices. While Justice Dickson’s distance from the majority mean did not
change dramatically, his distance from the liberal mean of the Court went down
by 7% once he became chief, which is a statistically significant change. This
finding suggests that although Justice Dickson continued to vote in the majority
throughout his tenure as chief, his ideological behaviour softened during his
chief years, positioning him, on average, at the ideological centre of his court.
In contrast, Justice McLachlin’s distance from the liberal mean of the Court did
not change much over her tenure, but she changed her distance from the majority
mean by 6%. This means she was willing to dramatically change her dissenting
behaviour to ensure that she was in the majority despite being roughly the same
ideological distance from the other members of her bench during her tenure as
chief as she was during her tenure as a puisne justice.
TABLE 1: PERCENT MAJORITY, LIBERAL VOTING, DISTANCE FROM MAJORITY,
AND LIBERAL MEAN FOR PUISNE AND CHIEF JUSTICE DICKSON, LAMER, AND
MCLACHLIN, 1973-2014
Percent
Majority Voting

Percent Liberal
Mean

Distance from
Majority Mean

Distance from
Liberal Mean

Puisne

91.9

52.9

+0.4

+7.1

Chief

95.2

44.4

+1.8

0.0

Difference

+3.2

-8.5

+1.4

-7.1

F Test

2.3

10.0**

0.6

9.8 **

Puisne

94.4

47.5

-0.1

+2.4

Chief

91.5

42.9

-0.4

+3.7

Difference

-2.9

-4.6

-0.3

+1.3

F Test

1.5

1.4

0.0

0.2

Puisne

89.4

39.4

-2.9

-0.5

Chief

94.0

48.3

+3.0

+1.5

Difference

+4.6

+8.9

+5.9

+2.0

10.1 **

7.7 **

24.4 ***

0.8

Justice
Justice Dickson

Justice Lamer

Justice McLachlin

F Test

** significant at the 99% confidence level
*** significant at the 99.9% level
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These initial differences between Justice Dickson and Justice McLachlin’s
activity point to a potentially compelling distinction between the two chief
justices. On first impression, Justice McLachlin exhibited extreme social
leadership behaviour once she became chief by voting in the majority more often,
suppressing her prior prolific dissenting activity, and voting slightly more liberally
to exert more control over her own court. Having said this, her ideological stance
relative to other justices did not change dramatically. Justice Dickson, in turn,
seized his opportunity to be a task leader, because he moved in a conservative
direction in order to preside in the majority coalition once he became chief.
Justice Lamer, on the other hand, did not change his behaviour once he became
chief, suggesting that he did not take on the social leadership role that appears to
be so coveted by Justice McLachlin. His voting patterns, at first blush, display the
trappings of a justice uninterested in fostering greater degrees of social cohesion
and instead reflect the habits of a justice who liked to state his mind both preand post-chief.
B. A TYPOLOGY OF IDEOLOGICAL AND STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE
TRANSITION TO CHIEF JUSTICE

The results featured in the third and fourth columns of Table 1 provide the seeds
for a typology of strategic change for justices moving from puisne to chief justice
status, especially since the data pays attention to relative positioning within a
court on two metrics: (1) ideological distance from the centre of the Court,
and (2) distance from the mean level of majoritarian voting. The two indicators
can correlate with each other, but they need not do so across all justices.
However, what we would expect in terms of leadership and strategic theory is
a conscious choice and specific movement within a two-dimensional space if
justices respond to their new leadership role. Put simply, chief justices should
move towards the ideological middle of the court if they desire to participate
in more majority-writing behaviour, which implies that they will increase their
majoritarian voting patterns and likely seek to exceed the court average. Figure
1 sketches out this hypothesized relationship for three hypothetical justices:
a conservative-leaning justice, a moderate, and a liberal. Seen in this light,
a conservative justice should move towards the moderate middle and seek to join
majority coalitions more often (moving up and to the left in our graph in Figure
1). Similarly, a strategic liberal should move up and to the right, while moderates
should just move up (increasing their majority voting). Our typology can be
tested by plotting the justice’s scores, pre- and post-chief, in terms of ideological
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distance from the mean and distance from the mean levels of majority voting
behaviour (see Figure 2).
FIGURE 1: A TYPOLOGY OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR IN THE TRANSITION
FROM PUISNE TO CHIEF JUSTICE: MAJORITARIAN AND IDEOLOGICAL
STRATEGIC RESPONSE
Relative Position to the
Court Mean in terms of
Majoritarian Voting

Relative Position to the Court Mean for Liberal Voting
Liberal
Mean
Conservative

More Majoritarian
Mean
More Dissent

Justice M
Justice L

Justice C

NOTES:
Justice C is a conservative justice who writes more dissents than average. Strategic response
theory suggests that Justice C’s elevation to the chief position would result in fewer
dissents, more majority votes (above the mean), and a curbing of ideological extremism
(movement toward the centre).
Justice L is a liberal justice who writes more dissents than average. Strategic response theory
suggests that his or her elevation to the chief position would result in fewer dissents, more
majority votes (above the mean), and a curbing of ideological extremism (movement
toward the centre).
Justice M is a relative moderate who is slightly above average in majority voting behaviour, and
slightly more conservative than the mean. Strategic response theory suggests that Justice
M’s elevation to the chief position would result in even more majority votes (above the
mean), and perhaps a slight curbing of ideological extremism (further movement toward
the centre). Justice M might exhibit the most ideological voting fluidity in order to control
the court more often (i.e., moving left and right to establish minimum winning coalitions).

The significance of Figure 2 lies in two key findings. Readers can first think
of the six graphs as pre- and post-chief plots of ideological and majoritarian
voting behaviour.
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FIGURE 2: JUSTICE LIBERALISM AND MAJORITARIAN VOTING BEHAVIOUR
RELATIVE TO THE COURT MEAN, PRE- AND POST-CHIEF STATUS, 1973-2014
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FIGURE 2: JUSTICE LIBERALISM AND MAJORITARIAN VOTING BEHAVIOUR
RELATIVE TO THE COURT MEAN, PRE- AND POST-CHIEF STATUS, 1973-2014
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When justices appear to the left of the centre line their annual voting records
are more conservative than the mean justice for that year. When justices are
above the horizontal centre line, their majority voting behaviour is higher than
the average majoritarian justice. According to theory, we expect chief justices
to have regression lines and predominant patterns of behaviour that are above
the horizontal centre line (i.e., if they are acting strategically, they should situate
themselves more often in the majority coalition, at least in comparison to their
earlier behaviour). Ideologically, it makes intuitive sense to think that justices
more proximate to the centre vertical line will more likely be above the horizontal
line. This aligns with the logic that ideologically moderate justices, or centrists,
are more likely to be present in majority coalitions (for confirmation of this, think
of Justice Anthony Kennedy in the United States and Justice Frank Iacobucci
in Canada).50 Our data coordinates in Figure 2 tend to document this trend,
though the patterns across the three post-Charter chiefs are not constant. Justice
Dickson’s movement post-chief is more dramatic in terms of its ideologically
conservative shift towards the centre of the Court (movement towards the left
in the Figure 2.B). Justice Lamer, meanwhile, exhibits a pattern of behaviour
across both graphs suggesting that as he found himself more liberal than the
Court mean, he increased his tendency to vote in dissent. In fact, his most liberal
distance from the mean appeared in his last year on the Court, resulting in his
lowest majority voting percentage of his entire judicial career. The wide variation
in his majority support scores suggests very little strategic ideological moderation
on his part. While he successfully sought out the ability to write more majority
opinions generally, it was sacrificed at the altar of any notions of ideological
centrism. Put simply, he did not appear to care if he was ideologically proximate
to the centre of the Court, especially in the waning days of his career. Justice
McLachlin, meanwhile, exhibits the most majoritarian strategic behaviour of all
three justices. Her voting record shifts noticeably upward after becoming chief
(note the change in the level of the regression lines in Figures 2.E and 2.F). Her
higher scores on majority voting tend to cluster around the vertical centre line,
and nearly every post-chief year features a positive value relative to the Court
mean on the majority voting score (in Figure 2.F). All of her pre-chief years are
below the horizontal line (Figure 2.E). Justice McLachlin’s graphs document clear
strategic behaviour that is not necessarily rooted in ideological change. Rather,
her wide swings in ideological position post-chief are less important than how
50. For discussion of Justice Iacobucci’s role as a centrist justice, see Benjamin RD Alarie &
Andrew Green, “The Reasonable Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Frank Iacobucci’s Career
on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 57:2 UTLJ 195.
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she increased her majority voting stances and suppressed her earlier tendency
to dissent. These are hallmark patterns of two forces at work: (1) a strategic
response to allow her to put her stamp on her own court’s legal doctrines, and (2)
a social leadership response on her part that is captured by the declining desire to
participate in dissents from her colleagues’ opinions.
A second point of significance in Figure 2 hinges on the behaviour
immediately preceding elevation to chief status for all three justices. The two years
immediately before chief status are highlighted in the left side graphs with blue
shading, while the first two years of chief are highlighted on the right side. Note
how each justice, immediately before becoming chief, altered their behaviour to
become more majoritarian (Figures 2.A, 2.C, and 2.D). This, in and of itself,
may be an interesting finding of strategic signaling to the powers that be in the
Prime Minister’s Office and the Department of Justice. If the parties responsible
for vetting future chiefs pay attention to collegial, coalition-building behaviour,
and if justices are aware that their majoritarian behaviour might be one of those
key signals to become chief justice, we find an interesting nugget within our
graphs of altered strategic voting in the year preceding a chief justiceship. It is also
interesting to note, however, that for each new chief justice, the second-year data
point is lower than the first, with each chief moving down and to the right in
Figures 2.B, 2.D, and 2.F (exhibiting more liberal and less majoritarian voting in
their second year as chief ). This may reflect a rebalancing on the part of the chief
back towards an expression of a latent independent streak. It may also reflect
the changing dynamics of their courts. In each case, they faced membership
transitions that may have pushed or pulled them in a slightly liberal direction.
Such compositional change is somewhat controlled for in the graphs by using
a mean benchmark comparison, but the possibility of membership change and
court docket change argue for a more nuanced analysis that can take into account
various explanatory variables.
C. OPINION AUTHORSHIP AND PATTERNS OF UNANIMITY AS PUISNE AND
CHIEF JUSTICE

Table 2 highlights three other indicators of potential leadership behaviour:
majority opinion authorship, dissent authorship, and the degree of unanimity
within a court. Intriguingly, Justice McLachlin exhibits two of the most profound
changes in Table 2. She clearly increased her majority opinion authorship during
her own court (jumping from almost 9% as puisne to almost 18% post-chief ).
Linked with that was a substantial decrease in dissenting opinion output, dropping
from 5.5% of cases to just 1.7% in her later years. One can infer from the data
that these transformations are clearly not random, but rather reflect a strategic
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positive shift towards task opinion leadership during her chief tenure, while also
reflecting a more socially responsible pattern of dissent suppression that probably
resonated well with her colleagues. Note how her change in patterns stands
in stark contrast to the lack of change by Chief Justice Dickson’s authorship
activity or Chief Justice Lamer’s dissenting authorship once they moved to the
helm of the Court. Justice Lamer’s rate of dissenting opinions, while not radically
different from his earlier years, actually increased slightly during his chief period.
This fact, in addition to the decline in unanimous opinions in Table 2, is another
indicator that social cohesion probably suffered during Chief Justice Lamer’s
Court, and, at first blush, suggests that he did not seek a social leadership role
on his own court. Granted, much of Justice Lamer’s tenure as chief overlapped
with that of the great dissenter Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, but one can speculate
whether the greater rates of dissent found in the Lamer Court might have been
different under a chief justice with more highly tuned social leadership skills.
However, his rise in majority authorship by almost 7% indicates that he, like
Justice McLachlin, seemed intent on enhancing his task leadership role on his
own court. Even so, these conclusions are preliminary and without the assistance
of multivariate analysis that controls for rival explanatory variables.
TABLE 2: EXPLAINING MAJORITY AUTHORSHIP, DISSENTING AUTHORSHIP, AND
UNANIMOUS OPINIONS FOR PUISNEAND CHIEF JUSTICES DICKSON, LAMER, AND
MCLACHLIN, 1973-2014
Percent Majority
Author

Percent Dissenting
Author

Percent Unanimous
Opinions

Puisne

11.4

3.2

75.1

Chief

14.7

2.0

79.0

Difference

+3.3

-1.2

+3.9

F Test

2.4

2.8

.8

Puisne

11.0

2.3

82.4

Chief

17.9

2.6

73.9

Difference

+6.9

+.3

-8.5

F Test

9.3 **

.1

11.2 **

Puisne

8.8

5.5

74.1

Chief

17.4

1.7

71.6

Justice
Justice Dickson

Justice Lamer

Justice McLachlin
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TABLE 2: EXPLAINING MAJORITY AUTHORSHIP, DISSENTING AUTHORSHIP, AND
UNANIMOUS OPINIONS FOR PUISNEAND CHIEF JUSTICES DICKSON, LAMER, AND
MCLACHLIN, 1973-2014
Justice
Difference
F Test

Percent Majority
Author

Percent Dissenting
Author

Percent Unanimous
Opinions

+8.6

-3.8

-2.5

37.7 ***

36.5 ***

1.1

** significant at the 99% confidence level
*** significant at the 99.9% level

D. EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF MAJORITY VOTING AS PUISNE AND CHIEF
JUSTICE

Table 3 examines the majority voting behaviour of all three chiefs, with the
analysis turning to a multivariate model that can assess the impact of other
factors that help explain changes in chief activity. The results in the first two
columns test for any chief effects across all three justices of interest, while the last
two columns isolate any differences between Chief Justices Dickson, Lamer, and
McLachlin over the 1973-2014 period while controlling for other variables in the
equation. The Chief Justice Lamer indicator was omitted in the latter equation
to test for statistically significant differences because he exhibited the smallest
change in majority voting behaviour of the three justices. There are a total of
seven variables in the first equation and eight in the second. Both overall models
provide a robust explanation of the variance in majority voting, accounting for
31% and 27%, respectively, of the variance across the years in the study (adjusted
R square = 0.31 for all chiefs and 0.27 for the model contrasting against Justice
Lamer, both F tests are significant at the 99.9% confidence level). The findings
in the first and second columns of the table reveal that four of the variables in
the equation proved statistically significant at predicting majority voting of the
three justices at or above the 99% confidence level. The most powerful variable
in the equation was the chief justice variable indicating, as expected, that when
they were elevated to the centre chair position they were overall 3% more likely
to vote in the majority (b = 3.4, see the first column of Table 3). This provides
confirmation of Danelski’s theory that, collectively, when these justices became
chief, they acted in a strategic manner. The three other variables that were in
the expected direction and statistically significant were panel size, ideological
distance from the Court mean, and Charter caseloads. The average panel size
indicator featured a coefficient of -2.24 and suggests that as the average panel
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size increased from seven to nine members, the three chief justices’ tendencies to
join the majority coalition decreased by 4% (2 multiplied by 2.24 = 4.48, see the
first column of Table 3). Clearly, the size of a given panel has a direct impact on
whether a justice joins the majority and thus has a greater opportunity to control
the outcome of the Court. When the percentage of Charter cases increased by
10%, there was an almost 2% drop in the likelihood that the three justices would
join the majority voting bloc (b = -.17, 10 x .17 = 1.7%, see the first column
of Table 3). Similarly, when the ideological distance from the mean grew, the
three chiefs voted with the majority coalition less often (b = -.32). Put another
way, if a justice was 10% more liberal than the rest of the justices in a given year,
they would cast 3.2% fewer majority votes. The coefficients for these variables
document the impact of a variety of factors that can either push or pull a justice
towards the majoritarian centre of their court. Most importantly for leadership
theories of judicial behaviour, the elevation to chief status clearly results in a
positive strategic impact that produces more majority votes.
TABLE 3: EXPLAINING MAJORITY VOTING BEHAVIOUR BY JUSTICES DICKSON,
LAMER, AND MCLACHLIN PRE- AND POST-CHIEF STATUS, 1973-2014
Variable

Chief Justice

Estimation for All Chiefs
Coefficient

Std. Error

3.43

1.35**

Chiefs Contrasted with Lamer
Coefficient

Std. Error

Chief Year 1 or 2

-.52

1.79

.19

1.80

Average Panel Size

-2.24

.82**

-2.61

1.05**

Ideol. Distance from Mean

-.32

.08***

-.29

.09***

Percent Charter Cases

-.17

.05***

-.13

.05**

Number of New Justices

.62

.67

.19

.73

Number of Cases

-.04

.03

Dickson as Chief
McLachlin as Chief
Constant
Adjusted R Square
F Test
Number of Observations

113.82

6.62

-.02

.03

2.35

1.82

4.23

2.22*

114.19

7.28

.31

.27

4.94***

3.90***

64

* significant at the 95% confidence level
** significant at the 99% confidence level
*** significant at the 99.9% level

64
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The data in the third and fourth columns of Table 3 takes into consideration
possible differences in majority voting behaviour between the three chiefs, as was
suggested by Table 1. Given that Justice Lamer exhibited little change in his
voting behaviour, his indicator was kept out of the equation for comparison
purposes. The second half of Table 3 suggests that much of the chief justice
transition effect is due to the behavioural difference of Justice McLachlin.
The findings indicate that only Chief Justice McLachlin exhibited statistically
significant difference in majority voting behaviour from Chief Justice Lamer (b =
4.23, significant at the 95% confidence level), indicating that she was 4% more
likely than Justice Lamer to vote with the majority once controlling for other
variables in the equation. While Chief Justice Dickson did join the majority more
often than Chief Justice Lamer, his change was not statistically significant and
suggests that he did not transform his status as a joiner of opinions, certainly not
as much as his female successor did. Meanwhile, the same three other variables
that proved statistically significant across all the chiefs were significant in this
equation as well. Collectively, these findings reinforce the findings from Table 1,
suggesting that Chief Justice McLachlin acted in the most strategic manner of
the three justices, changing her behaviour to become the consistent social leader
of the majority of her court. This pattern of majority voting change stands up in
the face of other rival explanatory factors for her behaviour, and it fits with her
own comments and expert reports on her approach to leading the Court more
cohesively and collegially.51
E.

EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF MAJORITY AUTHORSHIP AS PUISNE AND
CHIEF JUSTICE

An interesting question that dovetails with increased majority voting is whether
that transformation results in a concordant increase in majority opinion
writing—one of the hallmarks of task leadership in any court of last resort. Table
4 provides regression results to confirm the expectation that chief justices will
strategically work to assume this leadership role. Like the prior model, it examines
the opinion-writing relationship for all three justices collectively in the first two
51. Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, “The First Decade of the 21st Century: The Supreme
Court of Canada in Context” in David A Wright & Adam M Dodek, eds, Public Law at
the McLachlin Court: The First Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) vii; Peter J McCormick,
The End of the Charter Revolution: Looking Back from the New Normal (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2015) at 121-22; “Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin announces her
retirement after 28 years on Canada’s top bench,” The National Post (12 June 2017), online:
<nationalpost.com/news/politics/chief-justice-beverley-mclachlin-announcers-her-retirementafter-28-years-on-canadas-top-bench>.
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columns of the table and relative to each other in the third and fourth columns
of the table, this time omitting Justice Dickson because he altered his behaviour
the least. The overall statistics provide robust models, with the adjusted R Squares
of 0.42 and 0.49, which means that the model explains 42% and nearly 50%
of the variance in the justices’ majority opinion writing behaviour (statistically
significant at 99.9% confidence level, see the Adjusted R Square values in Table
4). Like the previous table, the most important variable in the equation is the
chief justice variable, indicating that collectively the three justices increased their
majority writing output four percentage points as chief justice, allowing them to
exert more control over the direction of the Court (statistically significant at the
99% confidence level). Two other indicators are significant predictors of majority
opinion output: (1) whether a chief justice was in his or her honeymoon period
(denoted by the first two years, b = 3.39, significant at the 95% confidence level),
and (2) the percentage of times they were in the majority coalition. For every
3% increase in majority votes in a year, the justices tended to write 1% more
majority opinions (b = 0.36, 3 x 0.36 = 1.08, significant at the 99% confidence
level). Readers should note that the effects of chief justice status on majority
opinion output are mainly derived from strategic changes made by Justices
Lamer and McLachlin. When we omit Justice Dickson from the equation, the
R Square value improves, and the impact of the indicators for Justices Lamer
(6.12% change) and McLachlin (5.84% change) are substantially higher than
in the first model (4.40%, see Table 4). The data for Chief Justice McLachlin is
particularly compelling because it reflects a departure from our initial findings
of lower majority opinion output by Chief Justice McLachlin in the first two
years of her leadership.52 Put simply, the addition of 12 years of data documents
an increasing tendency on Chief Justice McLachlin’s part to write more majority
opinions for her court. Such a transformation reflects the signature patterns of
a task leader. All in all, the regression models reinforce the leadership literature’s
central theoretical proposition that puisne justices who become chief can use the
act of voting more frequently in majority coalitions to help cement their ability
to lead their court. Moreover, the models help establish the unique strength of
the strategic behavioural change undertaken by Justice McLachlin. She is the
quintessential majoritarian leader on her court, having softened her dissenting
voting stances of the past to help build social cohesion and collegiality, which has
arguably strengthened the reputation of the Court.

52. Wetstein & Ostberg, Strategic Leadership,” supra note 35 at 665.
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TABLE 4: EXPLAINING MAJORITY OPINION AUTHORSHIP BY JUSTICES DICKSON,
LAMER, AND MCLACHLIN, 1973-2014
Variable

Estimation for All Chiefs
Coefficient

Std. Error

Chief Justice

4.40

1.51**

Chief Year 1 or 2

3.39

Average Panel Size

-.28

Chiefs Contrasted with
Dickson
Coefficient

Std. Error

1.90*

4.13

1.71**

.93

-1.38

1.10
.09

Ideol. Distance from Mean

.03

.10

.01

Percent Charter Cases

.08

.06

.08

.05

Number of New Justices

-.30

.72

-.19

.71

Number of Cases

-.02

.03

-.02

.03

Percent Majority Votes

.36

.14**

.36

.13**

Lamer as Chief

6.12

1.57***

McLachlin as Chief

5.84

2.25**

Constant
Adjusted R Square
F Test
Number of Observations

-19.93

-12.87

.42

.49

6.76***

7.67***

64

64

* significant at the 95% confidence level
** significant at the 99% confidence level
*** significant at the 99.9% level

Simultaneously, she transformed herself into a pivotal task leader within
her court, positioning herself to have a greater shot at writing for the Court
more frequently.
F.

EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF DISSENTING AUTHORSHIP AS PUISNE AND
CHIEF JUSTICE

If majority opinion authorship is a key indicator of task leadership, lack of
dissenting authorship might be seen as a flip-side symbol of social leadership.
When justices suppress their dissent, they are likely to be expressing ideological
assent, or more significantly, deciding not to ruffle feathers while they harbour
ideologically opposed views. When the latter behaviour occurs, justices are
acting strategically to enhance the social relationships within the court and foster
greater cohesion. Table 5 turns to an indirect barometer of social leadership,

508

(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

analyzing patterns of dissenting opinions by the three justices before and after
their promotion to the centre chair. Overall patterns are characterized in the first
two columns of the table, while possible differences between the three justices
are tested in the third and fourth columns of the table. This model controls for
ideological distance in order to tease out whether reduced patterns of dissent are
evident because of an element of social leadership or ideological agreement, while
simultaneously assessing whether chiefs express dissent less frequently. Both
overall models provide a robust explanation of the variance in dissenting opinion
authorship rates, accounting for 40% and 33% of the variance across the 41
years of the study (adjusted R square = 0.40 for all chiefs and 0.33 for the model
contrasting against Justice Dickson, both F tests are significant at the 99.9%
confidence level). The findings in the first two columns of Table 5 indicate that
that the chief justice variable provides the most important explanation for change
in dissenting opinion authorship. When the three justices moved to the helm of
the Court, they collectively reduced the number of dissents they authored by
almost 2.5%. This finding provides additional evidence to support Danelski’s
claim that when justices move to the centre chair they have the power to curb
their dissenting authorship activity to bring more cohesion to the Court.
Four other variables proved statistically significant in the equation, and three
of them were in the expected direction. For each new justice appointed to the
bench in any given year, the chief justice is likely to reduce the number of dissents
he or she authors by over 0.5% (b = -0.57, statistically significant at the 95%
confidence level). This finding suggests that new justices encourage chiefs to act
more collegially and try to create more cohesion on the bench. As expected, when
the ideological distance from the mean of the Court grew, the three justices were
more likely to write dissents (b = .11, significant at the 99.9% confidence level).
A more understandable way to interpret this is that if the three justices are 10%
more liberal than the rest of the justices in a given year, they would write 1.1%
more dissents in that year. As expected, when the percent of Charter cases grew
in a given year, the percent of dissenting opinions authored by the three chiefs
increased by 0.10%. In other words, for each additional 10 Charter cases heard
in a given year, the justices were likely to write 1 more dissenting opinion. Given
that Charter cases are likely to garner more conflict among members of the Court,
this finding is not particularly surprising. However, contrary to expectations, the
findings suggest that as the number of cases increased in a given year, the three
chief justices were more likely to write dissenting opinions (b = .02, statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level). Thus, if the Court were to increase the
workload by 20 cases in a given year, the dissenting opinion output would increase
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by almost 0.5% (b = .02 x 20 = .40, see Table 5). One could posit that this makes
sense because the more cases one hears the more likely that conflict could emerge
on the Court, leading to greater dissent activity by these three justices.
TABLE 5: EXPLAINING DISSENTING OPINION AUTHORSHIP BY JUSTICES
DICKSON, LAMER, AND MCLACHLIN, 1973-2014
Variable

Estimation for All Chiefs

Chiefs Contrasted with
Dickson

Coefficient

Std. Error

-2.46

.57***

Chief Year 1 or 2

.19

.75

-.46

.76

Average Panel Size

.56

.34

.78

.46*

Ideol. Distance from Mean

.11

.04***

.12

.04***

Percent Charter Cases

.10

.02***

.09

.02***

Number of New Justices

-.57

.28*

-.637

.32*

Number of Cases

.02

.01*

Chief Justice

Coefficient

Std. Error

.03

.01*

Lamer as Chief

-2.21

.69***

McLachlin as Chief

-2.00

.97*

Constant
Adjusted R Square
F Test
Number of Observations

-3.15

-5.53

.40

.33

7.06***

4.93***

64

64

* significant at the 95% confidence level
** significant at the 99% confidence level
*** significant at the 99.9% level

The third and fourth columns of Table 5 provide a more in-depth
understanding of the differences in the dissent authorship among the three
chiefs. Chief Justice Dickson was kept out of the equation for comparative
purposes because his dissent authorship changed the least. When controlling
for other variables in the equation, both Justice Lamer and Justice McLachlin’s
dissenting opinion authorship declined by 2.2% and 2.0% respectively after they
became chief compared to Justice Dickson (significant at the 99.9% and 95%
confidence level). These findings help shore up the data for Justice McLachlin
in Table 2 and show that when controlling for other variables in the equation,
Justice Lamer’s dissent output actually decreased significantly when compared to
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his male predecessor, which runs counter to the findings in Table 2. Table 5, then,
provides an important rationale for controlling for rival variables in the equation.
The initial impression of Justice Lamer dissenting more frequently is somewhat
misguided because it fails to take into consideration factors that might foster
dissents, including a larger volume of Charter cases, new members on the Court,
and a growing docket of cases under Chief Justice Lamer’s tenure. Put another
way, Justice Lamer’s dissenting behaviour during his tenure as chief does not look
so bad in the context of the volume and types of cases his court grappled with,
and he shows some signs of strategic dissent suppression. The most compelling
finding from Table 5, however, is the overwhelming evidence of the extensive
strategic social leadership activity of Chief Justice McLachlin.
G. EXPLAINING CHANGES IN PANEL SIZE ON THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA

What is most striking about the McLachlin transition to the power roles of task
and social leader is how it was accompanied by a tendency to grow average panel
sizes over time. Table 6 presents this tendency in stark relief, examining the
average panel size as a dependent variable across the three chief justice tenures.
It essentially tests for whether there was a change in the panel size across the three
chief tenures while considering possible rival explanations for this phenomenon.
The overall model provides a robust explanation of the variance in the average
panel size, accounting for 45% of the variance across the years in the study
(adjusted R square = 0.45, F test significant at the 99.9% confidence level). The
equation omits Justice Lamer’s indicator for comparative purposes, and reveals
that only the “McLachlin as Chief ” variable and the number of new justices
provide statistically significant predictors of the average panel size. The latter
variable indicates that for each new justice appointed to the bench in any given
year, the chief justice is likely to reduce the average panel size by almost 0.25%
(b = 0.23, statistically significant at the 99% confidence level). This finding
suggests that there is some legitimacy to the contention that chief justices allow
new justices a bit of time to acclimate to the top bench before throwing them
fully into the panel rotation. Over the course of Chief Justice McLachlin’s tenure
she increased the average size of deliberating panels by more than one justice
(b = 1.22 statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level). This finding
is significant because logically as one increases the average size of panels, there
is a greater likelihood disagreement will emerge and, as Table 2 indicates, the
less likely the justices collectively will join the majority opinion. This table
suggests that Chief Justice McLachlin’s social leadership behaviour was unique
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in that she not only increased the average size of the panels but joined majority
opinions more frequently despite the fact that she maintained relatively the same
ideological distance from her colleagues as when she was a puisne justice. These
combined findings suggest that Justice McLachlin deserves the title of “super
social leader” because she changed her behaviour so drastically in relation to her
former male colleagues.
TABLE 6: EXPLAINING THE CHANGE IN AVERAGE PANEL SIZE ACROSS THE
DICKSON, LAMER, AND MCLACHLIN COURTS, 1973-2014

Variable

Chiefs Contrasted with Lamer
Coefficient

Std. Error

Dickson as Chief

-.22

.23

McLachlin as Chief

1.22

.23***

Chief Year 1 or 2

.02

.23

Percent Charter Cases

.00

.01

Number of New Justices

-.23

.09**

Number of Cases

.01

.00

Constant

6.12

.45

Adjusted R Square
F Test
Number of Observations

.45
9.45***
64

* significant at the 95% confidence level
** significant at the 99% confidence level
*** significant at the 99.9% level

The last finding presents a central kernel that must be attributed to Justice
McLachlin’s leadership of her court. She became more majoritarian while also
increasing the level of justices’ participation on case panels. Those are two
phenomena that would normally cut against each other. Yet we believe she was
able to do this most likely because of her social leadership acumen. She clearly
cares about the nature of consensus building and the importance of the Court
speaking with a unified voice (she has said so directly).53 The fact that she was
able to retain remarkably strong patterns of majoritarian voting and maintain
relatively high levels of unity across the Court while growing panel sizes is a
53. McLachlin, supra note 51.
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remarkable feat of leadership. One reason for her success may be that, during her
tenure, the Court as a whole was shrinking its overall docket. The caseloads of
the Lamer Court were typically at or above 100 per year.54 The McLachlin Court
averaged between 60 and 75 per year. Such a transformation in workload suggests
an additional pattern of social leadership is in play. When docket sizes decline in
such a manner, more justices can be appointed to panels, making the work feel
more equalized and balanced in terms of cases heard, equalizing opportunities
for writing, and potentially enhancing the overall collegial esprit de corps. These
are patterns of female leadership behaviour that are cornerstones of the feminist
literature. For all of these reasons—greater majoritarian voting, suppressed
dissenting opinion patterns, increased panel sizes, and decreased docket sizes—
Chief Justice McLachlin exhibits hallmark attributes of an exemplary strategic
social and task leader.

IV. CONCLUSION
Theories of leadership and strategic behaviour posit that individuals ascending
to the chief justice position alter their behaviour in significant ways to define
the legacy of their court. Recent empirical work has examined the postulates of
Danelski’s leadership theory in great detail in the Supreme Court of the United
States,55 and there is growing interest in the leadership traits of SCC justices. Our
work builds on earlier scholarship in this area by documenting these patterns more
extensively across six key indicators of judicial behaviour, including majority voting
behaviour, majority and dissenting opinion authorship, ideological and majority
positioning within a court, and panel sizes. The concordance of data indicates
that Chief Justice McLachlin changed her behaviour the most dramatically of the
three modern chief justices of the SCC. She transformed from one of the most
prolific dissenters during her puisne years into a chief who dramatically curbed
the number of dissents she wrote, joined the majority coalition more often, and
nearly doubled her majority opinion authorship patterns. Her transformation is
indicative of a justice who strove to become both the social and task leader of her

54. Supreme Court of Canada, “Statistics 2007 to 2017” (28 February 2018), online: <www.
scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/stat/cat4-eng.aspx>; Peter McCormick, “Where Does the Supreme
Court Caseload Come From? Appeals from the Atlantic Courts of Appeal, 2000-2005”
(Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 2 June
2006), online: <www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/McCormick.pdf>.
55. See Danelski & Ward, supra note 5.
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court. She fostered a more cohesive and collegial court through her suppression
of dissent and her willingness to grow panel sizes amidst a shrinking docket.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s emergence as a unique kind of social and task
leader raises an important question about the role of her gender in shaping such
a transformation. Was her leadership transition the byproduct of her unique skills
and personality attributes or was there some component of feminist thinking
embedded in her operational style as the first woman to be “first among equals?”
We can only speculate without questioning her directly on this point. Yet her
empirical patterns of behaviour, and the manner in which she has described the
Court’s operations and its role suggests she paid great attention to the norms of
collegiality, reaching greater agreement, speaking with one voice, and protecting
the Court from criticism as a political institution. These traits match up well
with notions drawn from the literature depicting a different feminine voice.
Obviously, we do not want to draw definitive conclusions in a study of just one
female chief justice, but Chief Justice McLachlin’s language often reflects the
spirit of conciliation, compromise, fairness, and unity, all of which echo from
the works of Tannen and Gilligan.56 When these patterns of language are coupled
with her lessened tendency to dissent and greater tendency to allow more justices
to participate in cases heard by the Court, we suspect that a feminine difference
was clearly in play with Chief Justice McLachlin. It will be interesting to see if
this gender distinction becomes something of a pattern with the appointment of
another female chief justice.57
Chief Justice McLachlin’s leadership transformation is not to be seen as
negating the task leadership skills of her predecessors. While Chief Justice Lamer’s
majority opinion authorship patterns clearly document that he was an overall
task leader on his own court, evidence of Justice Dickson’s leadership activity
is less pronounced because our analysis has placed him in contrast to the other
two post-Charter chief justices. Prior research has documented that Chief Justice
Dickson exhibited profoundly strong task leadership in key areas of law, most
notably in the fields of civil rights and liberties and the environment.58 We also
know from prior work that Chief Justice Lamer acted as a central opinion author
56. Tannen, supra note 15; Gilligan, supra note 13.
57. Researchers will have to wait for that day to come. In December 2017, Justice Richard
Wagner was appointed as the new chief justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. See
Supreme Court of Canada, News Release, (12 December 2017), online: SCC Lexum
<scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/5694/index.do>.
58. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 22 at 119; Matthew E Wetstein
& CL Ostberg, Value Change in the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2017) at 52-53.
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in the criminal law cases across his entire tenure on the Court.59 This finding points
to a unique feature of how the Court operates, namely that the chief justices,
through their opinion assignments, are willing to allow different justices to play
key leadership roles in different areas of law based on their legal specialization
and interests. Indeed, interviews with the justices confirm this tendency to solicit
volunteers based on specialization and workload considerations.60 The limitations
of our study prevent an analysis of this characterization of judicial leadership.
We leave to another day the exploration of the nuances found in discrete areas of
law, patterns of separate concurrences, patterns of behaviour in written reasons for
judgment only, and more importantly an examination of the internal dynamics
within a court that would help document the social leadership patterns on the
post-Charter courts. Despite this caveat, the empirical patterns from this study
indicate that at the twilight of her tenure, Chief Justice McLachlin cemented her
legacy as a justice who was able to simultaneously serve as a social and task leader
on the top court of Canada.

59. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 22 at 72-74.
60. Greene et al, supra note 34; Songer et al, Law, Ideology, supra note 22.

